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Barbara N. Wiesinger
 
Introduction
1 This paper aims at surveying the extreme right scene in present-day Serbia. Its focus is on
informal  associations  which  represent  the  prototypical  organizational  form  of  the
contemporary  extreme  right1 rather  than  on  political  parties. 2 So  far,  such  loosely-
structured groups have rarely been studied3, presumably because their societal impact
seems hard to assess.4 The case of Serbia however, where they have flourished especially
since the ousting of Slobodan Milošević, demonstrates that informal extreme right groups
and networks, while they may not have realistic chances of usurping political power, can
considerably limit the security and civil freedoms of other citizens.5 Over the past few
years, Serbian extreme right activists have abused public space and the civil rights they
deny others to spread their ideology of hatred and intimidate or even attack perceived
enemies.6 The  climate  of  insecurity  and  fear  created  by  such  mostly  unsanctioned
offences poses a threat to the strengthening of civil society and the success of democratic
reform in Serbia which should not be underestimated. 
2 Before I go on to discuss the programme and activities of Serbia’s most visible extreme
right groups in more detail, it might be useful to define the term “right-wing extremism”.
7 The most inclusive (and therefore also contentious) definition was suggested by the
British historian Roger Griffin, who sees contemporary right-wing extremism as a form of
fascism, which he defines as “(…) a political ideology whose mythic core in its various
permutations is a palingenetic form of populist ultra-nationalism“8. Other scholars have
proposed to include a second characteristic – a fundamental opposition to democratic
values,  institutions  and  processes  –  into  the  definition  of  right-wing  extremism.9
Obviously, such minimum definitions are the result of idealizing abstraction and do not
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embrace all possible aspects of the phenomenon being investigated10. However, they seem
useful  in  that  they  avoid  the  problems associated  with  definitions  which enumerate
various  elements  of  right-wing  extremism11,  for  example,  that  it  is  not  clear  if  the
ideology of a given party or association has to demonstrate all,  most, many, a few or
maybe only one of those characteristics in order to be classified as extreme right. 
3 In this paper, I classify such groups as extreme right (a) whose ultra-nationalist ideology
emphasizes populism and the idea of renewal or rebirth culminating in the creation of a
new social order (Griffin’s definition)and (b) whose “political culture stands against the
fundamentals of the democratic system“12. 
 
Extreme right associations in contemporary Serbia
4 Since  2001,  the  Serbian extreme right,  which emerged during  the  1990s,  has  gained
considerable public visibility.13 Arguably, its flourishing is connected to Serbia’s perennial
political  and  economic  instability  as  well  as  to  the  accompanying  crisis  in  value
orientation and social norms.14 The Serbian extreme right scene is a loosely-knit network
of informal groups which can be (and sees itself as) divided into two camps. The Christian
right, whose ideology is characterized by clerical nationalism, political conservatism, and
xenophobia, has forged links with the Serbian Orthodox Church (Srpska Pravoslavna Crkva,
SPC) as well as with the political establishment15.  The most prominent groups in this
camp are the Srpski Sabor Dveri (Serbian Assembly Doorway16) and the Otačastveni Pokret
Obraz (Fatherland Movement Dignity). Students’ associations such as Sveti Justin Filozof17
(Saint  Justin  the  Philosopher),  which  originated  at  Belgrade  University’s  Faculty  of
Philosophy, or Nomokanon18, anassociation of law students,and the group Vitez (Knight),
which is based at Belgrade’s medical school, also belong to the Christian right.19
5 The racist extreme right,which is well-connected to international neo-Nazist and white
supremacist networks, consists of groups such as Krv i Čast (Blood and Honour), Nacionalni
stroj  (National  Formation)and  Rasonalisti20.21Just  like  the  Christian  right,  these  groups
stress xenophobia, authoritarianism and the need for a fundamental renaissance of the
nation.  What distinguishes them is their insistence on the centrality of  “race”,  while
Orthodox religion is relegated to the background.  The racist extreme right seems to have
less activists than the Christian right. Since it has repeatedly and aggressively encroached
on public space, however, it should not be lightly dismissed as marginal. 
6 Currently, the Serbian extreme right seems to concentrate on spreading its worldview
through publications and events such as public discussions, concerts, demonstrations etc.
Its  most  important platform is  the internet,  which activists  and sympathizers use to
communicate with each other,  announce events,  and circulate propaganda material.22
Many extreme right  groups  also  publish magazines  and books;  one even hosts  a  TV
programme.23
 
The Christian right: Srpski Sabor Dveri and Otačastveni Pokret
Obraz
7 The Srpski Sabor Dveri originated in 1999 when a group of students of Serbian philology at
Belgrade University started publishing the magazine Dveri Srpske.24 Today, the Srpski Sabor
Dveri has chapters in more than 20 Serbian towns. Dveri regularly organize well-attended
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public lectures and meetings in Belgrade, other Serbian towns and abroad.25 Together
with Vitez, an association of Orthodox physicians, Dveri campaign against abortion and for
higher birth-rates to strengthen the Serbian nation(Pokret za život/Movement for Life)26. 
Dveri are affiliated with the Association of Serbian Youth (Sabor Srpske Omladine).27 They also
initiated the Srpska Mreža (Serbian network), a network of Christian Right groups.28
8 Dveri’s programme is based on svetosavlje, i.e. a combination of Serbian Orthodox piety
and extremely nationalist attitudes.29 The prominent place Dveri accord to svetosavlje links
their programme to early 20th century Serbian Orthodox thinkers such as Bishop Nikolaj
Velimirović,  who is  controversial  because  of  his  anti-Semitic  opinions30.  In  a  speech
entitled “The Nationalism of St. Sava” (1935), Velimirović portrayed the medieval saint as
the creator of the SPC and of the Serbian nation, thereby postulating an indissoluble bond
between religious and national sentiments.31 In accordance with this interpretation of
Saint Sava’s heritage, Dveri propagate the close cooperation of state and church, which
they see symbolized in the two-headed eagle of the Serbian coat of arms and personified
in Saint Sava and his brother Saint Stefan Prvovenčani.32 Consequently, Dveri demand
substantial changes in the political system which would give more power to professional
associations and “crkveno-narodni sabori”, councils of (arbitrarily chosen) “representatives
of the people” and the SPC.33Dveri also promote the restauration of the monarchy.34
9 A conviction that there is a special bond between god and the Serbian nation lies at the
centre of Dveri’s worldview. Supposedly, Saint Sava forged a covenant (zavet) with god,
which was later confirmed by Car Lazar when he opted for a “heavenly kingdom” (carsko
nebesko) on the eve of the Battle of Kosovo Polje (1389). By organizing the 1804 Serbian
uprising against the Ottomans, Karađorđe renewed this covenant. The Serbian nation is
obliged to eternally bear witness to the covenant by respecting the nation’s spiritual and
moral  values and by defending its  ethnic  territory.35 This  includes  the  repression of
everything  deemed  “abnormal”:  “For  Serbs,  homosexuality  and  other  forms  of  deviant
behaviour, abortion or sectarianism [i.e. membership in non-traditional religious groups or
participation in their activities, BNW] cannot be normal phenomena and we will fight against
them by peaceful means.”36
10 In  their  programme and other  publications,  Dveri stress  a  nationalized religiousness,
secular national issues and the need for a comprehensive renewal (obnova) of the nation
which alone would make Serbia once again “strong and healthy”.37 Their ethnopluralism38,
as well as their homophobia and non-acceptance of alternative faith groups, points to the
fact that their proclaimed tolerance39 is rather limited. Also, Dveri express a deep-seated
mistrust not only of the current political elite, but more generally of liberal democracy,
which they aim to replace with a hierarchical society governed by pseudo-democratic
institutions (the crkveno-narodni sabori) and a king. In Dveri’s utopia religious, political and
personal freedom would be restricted in case of its incompatibility with the “spiritual and
moral values” of the Serbian nation. Following the definition given in the introduction,
Dveri could  therefore  be  classified  as  belonging  to  the  extreme  right.  Importantly,
however,  Dveri is  the  only  organization  discussed  in  this  article  which  admits  the
importance of human rights40 and explicitly limits its struggle for a national renaissance
to peaceful means. 
11 The Otačastveni Pokret Obraz is a more radical Christian right organization, which was set
up in the mid-1990s when a group of Belgrade students began publishing the magazine
Obraz.41 Today,  the  association  allegedly  has  several  thousand  activists  in  Serbia,
Montenegro, and the Republika Srpska.42Obraz,led until 2001 by the late Nebojša M. Krstić
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43, became notorious when a number of its members participated in the assault on the
2001 lesbian and gay pride parade in Belgrade44. Over the years, various racist, especially
anti-Semitic,  graffiti  were attributed to  Obraz;  however,  such accusations  were never
proven.45
12 Similarly  to  Dveri,  Obraz sees  orthodox  piety  and  an  exaggerated  patriotism  as  the
foundations of  the Serbian nation and frequently refers  to Nikolaj  Velimirović  as  its
chosen spiritual and moral authority.46 Using the words of epic poetry, the association
represents its activities as a struggle for the “honourable cross” and “golden freedom”.47
Obraz portrays itselfas the furtherer of the Serbian nation’s resurrection on the  basis of
svetosavlje: “Obraz is the only movement for a school with faith, politics with honour, a patriotic
army and a state with God’s blessing.”48Obraz’s central goal is the establishment of a strong
and wealthy nation-state which would be able to defend itself against its many perceived
enemies.49 In  order  to  achieve  this,  liberal  democracy,  which  Obraz calls  a  “judeo-
masonic” tool of oppression, must be replaced by a corporative state led by patriotic and
pious statesmen.50 In Obraz’s ideal society, “offences” such as homosexual orientation or a
non-Orthodox creed would be punishable.51
13 What distinguishes Obraz from the more moderate Dveri is  Obraz’s  openly proclaimed
hatred for non-Serbs, especially for Albanians, Muslims and Croats, their fervent anti-
Semitism and their repeated threats to resort to violence in order to realize their aims.52
It comes as no surprise that Obraz denies any Serbian responsibility for the Yugoslav wars
of secession53 and celebrates Radovan Karadžić and Ratko Mladić as Serbian heroes54. In
2002, for example, the organisation launched a campaign in support of Radovan Karadžić
under the heading “Every Serb is Radovan” (“Svaki  je  Srbin Radovan”).55  Furthermore,
Obraz threatensthat Serbia will use force to regain hold of Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina
and Kosovo, which it defines as “territories of the Serbian Fatherland”.56
14 Even such a short survey of Obraz’s programme shows that the organization fulfills the
criteria  for  being  classified  as  extreme right.57 Firstly,  Obraz promotes  an  aggressive
nationalism with strong clericalist elements. Secondly, it claims that a profound renewal
is necessary for the Serbian nation to overcome its present wretched and decadent state.
Thirdly, Obraz rejects liberal democracy and the humanistic values it is based on.Fourthly,
Obraz endorses the use of violence against opponents.58
 
Krv i Čast and Nacionalni stroj
15 The association Krv i čast (Blood and Honour)was founded in 1995 as a member of the
international,  UK-based  Blood  and  Honour neo-Nazi  network 59.60Combat  1861,  an
organization which Krv i čast describes as its activist branch, was set up in 2003.62Krv i čast
boasts  chapters  in  Belgrade,  Novi  Sad,  Niš,  Apatin  and  Jagodina.  It  publishes  four
magazines,  organizes  concerts,  participates  in  neo-Nazi  meetings  abroad,  regularly
celebrates Hitler’s birthday etc.63Krv i  čast promotes “leaderless resistance”, a strategy
which emphasizes individual and small group activism. There is no formal membership,
making it impossible to say how many activists the organization has.64
16 Krv i čast is affiliated with Nacionalni stroj (National formation), another informal white
supremacist and ultra-nationalist group.65 The Krv i čast website features the  programme
and  proclamations  of  Nacionalni  stroj,  reports  on  its  activities  and  promotes  its
controversial  leader Goran Davidović66.  Nacionalni  stroj’s  programme is very similar to
The Continuing Presence of the Extreme Right in Post-Milošević Serbia
Balkanologie, Vol. XI, n° 1-2 | 2008
4
that of Krv i čast, and as a member of the US-based white supremacist network Stormfront, 
Nacionalni stroj undoubtedly belongs to what could be termed the “racist international”. 
17 Over the past few years, activists of Krv i čast and Nacionalni stroj may or may not have
been involved in incidents such as the destruction of the Belgrade and Niš mosques in
March 2004 (connected to clashes between Albanians and Serbs in Kosovo in the same
month67), attacks on the pacifist group Žene u crnom (Women in Black) in July 2005, and,
more recently, an assault on Bosnian and Serbian peace activists in Niš (May 2007). In any
case, these and other similar incidents are celebrated on Krv i čast’s website as laudable
patriotic acts.68 In autumn 2007, Krv i čast and Nacionalni stroj organized a nationalist rally
in  Novi  Sad  (the  “March  for  Serbian  Unity”),  which  was  prohibited  by  the  local
authorities. Nevertheless, several dozen extreme right activists were able to gather in the
city  centre,  which resulted  in  clashes  with  counter-protesters.69 Planning  for  similar
marches to take place this year is already under way.70 The “activism” of Nacionalni stroj
and Krv  i  čast  includesdiscriminatory  graffiti  on  public  and  private  property, which
constitutes an offence under Serbian law as an incitement of ethnical, racial or religious
hatred.71
18 Krv i  čast can undoubtedly be classified as a neo-Nazist association. Not only do they
openly admire National Socialism and venerate Adolf Hitler. Even more significantly, they
believe  that  humanity  is  divided  into  unequal  “races”  of  which  the  white  “race”  is
allegedly the most highly evolved. In the modern world, however, the white “race” is in
peril  of  extinction  unless  it  overcomes  the  ills  of  multi-culturalism,  decadence  and
democracy through a revolutionary struggle for its biological continuance and cultural
rebirth.72 This rebirth depends, inter alia, on higher birth-rates and a ban on abortion – a
view that Krv i čast share with the Christian right groups Dveri and Obraz.73 According to
Krv i čast, the most dangerous enemies of the white “race” are the Jews74, who are held
responsible  for  the  current  sorry  state  of  Serbia75 and especially  for  the  1999 NATO
bombardement76 (a claim also made by Obraz77). The neighbouring nations, who are said
to unjustly “occupy” the “Serbian” territories of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro, and
Kosovo78, are similarly disliked by Krv i čast activists.
19 The programme of Nacionalni stroj resembles that of Krv i čast. Nacionalni stroj promotes
the “preservation and rebirth of the healthy values of the Serbian nation as a constituent part of
the white race”.79 The associationdemands a centralized nation-state based on “national
liberty, social rights and the racial-biological protection of the nation”. According to Nacionalni
stroj, “racial” and national consciousness have the potential to overcome the conflicting
interests of different strata of society, resulting in the harmonious coexistence of the
“organic national community”. This community would be led by an authoritarian head of
state, who would enjoy the support of a strong army and the national church, presumably
the  SPC.  Only  white  people  loyal  to  the  Serbian  nation  would  be  entitled  to  full
citizenship.  Furthermore,  the  media  would  be  controlled  by  the  state,  while
homosexuality,  pornography,  abortion and non-traditional  religious  groups  would be
outlawed.80
20 Krv i čast and Nacionalni stroj clearly deserve the label “extreme right”. They promote an
aggressive nationalism, based on the purported supremacy of  the white “race”.  They
claim to fight a revolutionary struggle for the renewal of the Serbian nation and the
white “race” in general. Krv i čast and Nacionalni stroj incite hatred against other nations,
political opponents and religious, ethnic and sexual minorities. They despise the notion
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of equality, reject democracy, and, judging by their activism, endorse the use of violence
to further their aims. 
 
Summary and outlook
21 This paper surveyed the extreme right scene in contemporary Serbia and discussed four
groups – Srpski Sabor Dveri, Otačastveni Pokret Obraz, Krv i čast and Nacionalni stroj – in more
detail. It showed that the programmes of these organizations are strikingly similar in that
they focus on an exaggerated nationalism centred on the idea of national rebirth and a
populist suspicion of democratic values, institutions and processes. The main difference
seems to be that the Christian right groups yearn for a renewal of the nation through a
return to “traditional values”, among which Orthodox piety, hierarchical social relations
and a rural way of life feature most prominently, while the racist right associations strive
for a national renaissance based on the alleged supremacy of the white “race”. In their
call for authoritarian rule and a strong leader who would guarantee national unity by
suppressing internal dissent while at the same time “defending” the nation’s interests
against its many perceived external enemies, all four groups are united. They also share a
hatred of difference which expresses itself in the refusal to accept as legitimate opinions
and lifestyles other than their own. 
22 Necessarily,  the  descriptive  survey  presented  in  this  article  leaves  many  questions
unanswered. What do individual activists and sympathizers believe, and how does that
relate to the programmes formulated by extreme right groups and parties on the one
hand, and the opinions of the non-extremist majority of Serbian citizens on the other?
How widespread are extreme right ideas in contemporary Serbia? How can we evaluate
Serbian right-wing extremism in its international context? To answer these questions,
further and more detailed research is needed. 
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Society, 34(1), 2006, pp.7-31.
5.  To cite just two examples: In February 2008, members of Obraz prevented the opening of an
exhibition featuring works by Kosovo Albanian artists (cf. « Obraz i policija u centru Beograda »,
07/02/2008,  http://www.b92.net/,  accessed  27/04/2008,  « Neophodna zabrana klerofašističkih
organizacija »,  09/10/02/2008,  http://www.danas.co.yu/,  accessed  27/04/2008,  « Sprečavanje
šiptarske izložbe u Beogradu », 07/02/2008, http://www.srb-obraz.org/, accessed 01/03/2008). A
few  days  later,  self-declared  sympathizers  of  the  same  organization  tried  to  prevent  the
promotion of a publication by contributors to the critical radio broadcast Peščanik (« Obraz na
promociji  knjige  Peščanika »,  12/02/2008,  http://www.b92.net/,  accessed  27/04/2008,
« Obrazovci  napali  autore  Peščanika »,  13/02/2008,  http://www.blic.co.yu/,  accessed
27/04/2008).
6.  Attacks on members of Serbia’s Muslim, Romany and Jewish minorities proliferate (cf. AI 2001,
Byford  2003:5f,  Stephen  Roth  Institute  2005).  Sexual  minorities  are  also  targeted  by  violent
extremists, as the incidents in connection with the 2001 gay pride parade in Belgrade illustrate
(cf. AI 2001, Nikolić 2001). Frequent threats against critical journalists and civil rights activists
(cf.  GSA: Policija ignoriše pretnje,  22/04/2008,  Pretnje smrću predsedniku NDNV, 05/04/2007,
both on http://www.b92.net/, accessed 26/04/2008) can often also be traced to origins in the
extreme right scene. 
7.  For a comprehensive discussion pertaining especially to Central and Eastern Europe, cf. Ramet
1999.
8.  Griffin (Roger), « Fascism’s new faces (and new facelessness) in the „post-fascist“ epoch », in
Griffin (Roger) et al., éds, Fascism Past and Present, West and East. An International Debate on
Concepts and Cases in the Comparative Study of the Extreme Right. Stuttgart: ibidem, 2006, p.41;
Betz (Hans-Georg), « The Growing Threat of the Radical Right », in Merkl (Peter H. ), Weinberg
(Leonard), éds., Right-Wing Extremism in the Twenty-First Century. London/Portland, OR, Cass,
2003, p.76; Ignazi, (Piero), « The Extreme Right: Defining the Object and Assessing the Cause », in
Schain (Martin) et al., éds, Shadows over Europe. The Development and Impact of the Extreme
Right in Western Europe. New York/Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, pp.24-25)
9. Ignazi, (Piero), « The Extreme Right: Defining the Object and Assessing the Cause », in Schain
(Martin) et al., éds, Shadows over Europe. The Development and Impact of the Extreme Right in Western
Europe. New  York/Basingstoke,  Palgrave  Macmillan,  p.23  and  25-27;  Jaschke  (Hans-Gerd), 
Rechtsextremismus. Available from www.bpb.de/themen/DU09IB.htm, accessed 21/01/2008, p.2).
For a critique of the emphasis on the anti-system properties of right-wing extremism in many
definitions see Kowalsky (Wolfgang), Schröder (Wolfgang), « Einleitung. Rechtsextremismus –
Begriff,  Methode,  Analyse »,  in  Wolfgang  Kowalsky  and  Wolfgang  Schröder,  éds,
Rechtsextremismus. Einführung und Forschungsbilanz. Opladen, Westdeutscher Verlag, 1994, p.9.
10. Griffin (Roger), « Fascism’s new faces (and new facelessness) in the „post-fascist“ epoch », in
Griffin  (Roger) et  al.,  éds,  Fascism  Past  and  Present,  West  and  East.  An  International  Debate  on
Concepts and Cases in the Comparative Study of the Extreme Right. Stuttgart: ibidem, 2006, p.37.
11. Hagtvet (Bernt), « Right-Wing Extremism in Europe », Journal of Peace Research, 31(3), 1994,
p.241.
12. Ignazi,  (Piero),  « The  Extreme  Right:  Defining  the  Object  and  Assessing  the  Cause »,  in
Schain (Martin) et al., éds, Shadows over Europe. The Development and Impact of the Extreme Right in
Western Europe. New York/Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, p.25.
13. Krv  i  Čast was  founded  in  1995,  the  closely  affiliated  group  Combat  18 in  2003  ( http://
www.bhserbia.org/interview.htm,  accessed  14/11/2007).  The  Otačastveni  pokret  Obraz was
founded  in  1998  (cf.  http://www.srb-obraz.org/,  Hronologija,  accessed  01/03/2008;  see  also
Stephen Roth Institute 2005, Nikolić 2001, AI 2001.) The Srpski Sabor Dveri – Nacionalna Organizacija
The Continuing Presence of the Extreme Right in Post-Milošević Serbia
Balkanologie, Vol. XI, n° 1-2 | 2008
9
Slobodnih Ljudi started with a student paper in 1999 (cf.  http://www.stari.dverisrpske.com/, O
Nama, accessed 15/11/2007). 
14.  Several  important  aspects  of  Serbian  statehood  –  territory,  form  of  government,
constitution, and symbols – remained unresolved until rather recently. Political violence, which
culminated in the 2003 assassination of Prime Minister Zoran Ðinđić, also contributed to Serbia’s
instability. Roger Eatwell (2003:50-58) called explanations of the rise and success of right-wing
extremism that focus on such structural aspects „demand-side theories“.
15. Byford (Jovan),  « Christian  Right-Wing  Organizations  and  the  Spreading  of  Anti-Semitic
Prejudice in Post-Milosevic Serbia: The Case of the Dignity Patriotic Movement », East European
Jewish Affairs 32(2), 2002, pp.43-60., Petrović (Ivana), Lazić (Nikola), Klerikalna desnica pridobija
srpsku  omladinu,  2005.  Available  from http://www.razmena.org/sh/88/1/746/?tpl=94,  accessed
25/04/2008)
16.  This translation follows Byford 2003:6. Literally, dveri means doors. The term refers to the
doors in the ikonostas, the partition in Orthodox churches which divides the sanctuary from the
nave (cf. Kuburic:4). 
17.  The association promotes “national values” in institutions of higher education with the aim
of introducing such contents  into teaching and research as would “lead to the spiritual  and
cultural  renewal”  of  the  Serbian  nation.  http://www.svetijustin.cjb.net/,  O  nama,  accessed
26/04/2008.
18.  Cf. their site http://www.nomokanon.org.yu/.
19.  These  groups’  classification  as  extreme  right,  however,  would  need  to  be  based  on  a
thorough analysis of their respective ideology and activities which this short survey cannot offer.
20.  A pun on rasa/race and nacionalisti/nationalists. Cf. their site http://www.rasonalisti.net/.
21.  All three associations were classified as neo-Nazist by the Serbian Interior Ministry. Cf. Prvi
zvaničan spisak neonacista (10/12/2005), http://www.b92.net/, accessed 14/11/2007. 
22.  Internet forums and blogs are the most important means of communication for the extreme
right.  See  for  example  Komentar–Srpski  Internet  Parlament/Glas  Desnice ( http://
www.komentar.org.yu/,  accessed  30/01/2008)  or  http://www.vidovdan.org/,  accessed
26/04/2008. On Internet use by the German extreme right, see Fromm 2007 and Schenkel 2007. 
23.  Krv i Čast publishes the magazines “Krv i Čast“, “Novi Signal“ (New Signal) and “Beli Vuk“
(White Wolf).  The group’s newest product is  “Obnova” (Renewal),  whose first edition (with a
focus on Kosovo) is currently advertised on the Krv i  čast website  (http://www.bhserbia.org/,
accessed 28/04/2008). Srpski Sabor Dveri’s magazine is called “Dveri Srpske“. The association also
presents a TV programme on TV Galaksija 032 (cf. http://www.dverisrpske.com/, 15/11/2008).
The  first  issues  of  the  magazine  “Obraz”  appeared  in  1995  (cf.  http://www.srb-obraz.org/,
Hronologija, accessed 01/03/2008).
24.  Between 1999 and 2007, 31 issues of the magazine appeared. Currently, the regular issues are
published  electronically,  while  the  special  issues  still  appear  in  print.  Cf.  http://
www.stari.dverisrpske.com/,  O  nama,  accessed  15/11/2007,  see  also  http://
www.dverisrpske.com/, Štampano izdavaštvo and Elektronsko izdavaštvo, accessed 01/02/2008.
Special issues in the past discussed, for example, “Communist crimes against the Serbian people”,
“Hate  speech  against  everything  Serbian”  and  controversial  historical  figures  such  as  Draža
Mihajlović,  the  World  War  II  Četnik  leader,  or  Nikolaj  Velimirović,  the  early  20th century
theologian, Serbian nationalist and Orthodox saint. 
25.  According to Dveri, its popular Thursday lectures at Belgrade University’s Technical Faculty
are usually attended by several hundred people (www.staridverisrpske.com, Beogradska duhovna
renesansa,  accessed  15/11/2007).  On  other  events  organized  by  Dveri,  see  http://
www.dverisrpske.com/, O nama, accessed 26/04/2008.
26.  Cf.  http://www.stari.dverisrpske.com/,  O  nama,  accesssed  15/11/2008,  http://
www.stari.dverisrpske.com/,  Aktivnosti,  accessed  15/11/2008,  also  http://
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www.dverisrpske.com/, Načela i smernice Srpskog sabora Dveri, Obnova domaćinske porodice,
accessed 16/01/2008. 
27.  “Radi  se  o  omladinskom  pokretu  za  utemeljenje  u  crkvenom  iskustvu  i  nacionalnom
identitetu mladih ljudi koji  žele da se stave na raspolaganje na korist svoje crkve i  otačanstva.“
http://www.stari.dverisrpske.com/, O nama, accesssed 15/11/2008.
28.  Members of Srpska Mreža include, among others, Naši (Aranđelovac, http://www.nasi.org.yu/,
accessed 16/01/2008), Serbian and Bosnian chapters of the Svetosavska Omladinska Zajednica, the
Sabor  Omladine  Justinove  (Vranje),  Nomokanon,  and  the  SPC’s  Odbor  za  Jasenovac.  See  http://
www.vidovdan.org/, Srpska mreža, accessed 28/04/2008.
29.  See  Branimir  Nešić,  Svetosavlje  i  evropske  integracije,  http://www.dverisrpske.com/,
accessed  01/02/2008,  http://www.stari.dverisrpske.com/,  O  nama,  accessed  15/11/2007,  and
http://www.dverisrpske.com/,  Načela  i  smernice  Srpskog  Sabora  Dveri,  Obnova  Svetosavlja,
accessed 16/01/2008. 
30. Byford (Jovan),  « From  ‘Traitor’  to  ‘Saint’:  Serbian  Bishop  Nikolaj  Velimirovic  in  Public
Memory. Analysis of Current Trends in Antisemitism series », (ACTA), No. 22, published by the
Sassoon International Centre for the Study of Antisemitism, Hebrew University, Jerusalem, 2004 ;
Byford (Jovan), « Canonisation of Bishop Nikolaj Velimirović and the legitimisation of religious
anti-Semitism in contemporary Serbian society », East European Reports, 6 (3), 2004.
31. Ðorđević (Mirko), Srpska konzervativna misao. Belgrade, HCHRS, 2003, p.58. The text was re-
published by Ihtus,  a publishing company notorious for promoting right-wing extremism. Cf.
http://www.dr-jurjevic.org/IhtusKatalog.pdf, accessed 27/04/2008.
32.  Cf.  http://www.dverisrpske.com/,  Načela  i  smernice  Srpskog  Sabora  Dveri,  Obnova
demokratije i monarhije, accessed 16/01/2008.
33.  Cf.  http://www.dverisrpske.com/,  Načela  i  smernice  Srpskog  Sabora  Dveri,  Obnova
parohijske  zajednice  i  crkveno-narodnih  sabora,  accessed  16/01/2008:  “U  participativnoj
demokratiji,  u  kojoj  razna  stručna  i  patriotska  udruženja  imaju  svoj  glas  i  uticaj,  vidimo
neophodno korekciju  građanskog  rata  političkih  stranaka  koji  je  demolirao  srpsku  politiku.“
Dveri’s  corporativism is also expressed in their slogan “Za nacionalnu sabornost u različitosti
profesija!” http://www.stari.dverisrpske.com/, Aktivnosti, accessed 15/11/2007. Such ideas are
resonant of ultra-conservative, clericalist regimes such as Austrofascism (cf. Tálos/Manoschek
2005).
34.  Cf.  http://www.dverisrpske.com/,  Načela  i  smernice  Srpskog  Sabora  Dveri,  Obnova
demokratije i monarhije, accessed 27/04/2008): “Kraljevina omogućava nadstranački red i mir (…
). Kralj je simbol nacionalnog jedinstva, štit pobožnosti i čuvar državne celine.” 
35.  “Ovo naše opredeljenje [for svetosavlje, BNW], dakle, nije mit o samozavaravanje o Srbima
kao narodu najstarijem i nebeskom, već praksa svakodnevnog svedočenja duhovnih i moralnih
vrednosti  našeg  naroda  i  odbrane  njegovog  opstanka  na  vekovnom  životnom  tlu.”  http://
www.dverisrpske.com/, Načela i  smernice Srpskog Sabora Dveri,  Obnova svetosavlja, accessed
16/01/2008.
36.  “Homoseksualizam i drugi vidovi devijantnog ponašanja, abortus ili  sektaštvo za Srbe ne
mogu biti normalne pojave i protiv njih ćemo se boriti svim miroljubivim sredstvima.” http://
www.dverisrpske.com/,  Načela  i  smernice  Srpskog  Sabora  Dveri,  Obnova  srpske  prosvete,
accessed 16/01/2008. 
37.  “Obnova  našeg  naroda  mora  početi  od  obnove  vere,  duhovnosti  i  morala,  institucija
parohijske zajednice i crkveno-narodnih sabora, pa preko obnove porodice, prosvete i sela, voditi
u  obnovu  nacije  i  države.”  http://www.dverisrpske.com/,  Načela  i  smernice  Srpskog  Sabora
Dveri, Uvod, accessed 16/01/2008. References to a “strong and healthy nation” can be found ibid.,
Obnova domaćinske porodice.
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38.  “Srbija se zalaže za Evropu nacija kao zajednicu različitih naroda, kao zajednicu u kojoj se
susreću i  kroz  koju  se  uvažavaju  razne  kulture  (…).”  http://www.dverisrpske.com/,  Načela  i
smernice Srpskog Sabora Dveri, Odnos sa drugima, accessed 16/01/2008.
39.  “Mi ne mrzimo druge,  nego volimo svoje,  mi ne napadamo druge,  nego branimo svoje.“
http://www.stari.dverisrpske.com/,  O  nama,  accessed  15/11/2007,  see  also  ibid.,  Odnos sa
drugima.  Specifically  on  anti-Semitism,  see  Boško  Obradović,  Trojanski  konj  antisemitizma,
01/12/2007, http://www.dverisrpske.com/, accessed 01/02/2008.
40.  However,  only  the  rights  to  life,  property,  education  and  equality  before  the  law  are
recognized  as  “God-given”,  basic  human  rights.  Cf.  http://www.dverisrpske.com/,  Načela  i
smernice Srpskog Sabora Dveri, Obnova srpske prosvete, accessed 16/01/2008.
41.  According to Obraz, Nebojša M. Krstić founded the publishing house Srbski obraz in 1994 with
the support of the SPC. The magazine “Obraz” was first published in 1995. Cf. http://www.srb-
obraz.org/, Hronologija, accessed 01/03/2008.
42.  Cf. AI 2001. 
43.  Nebojša Krstić died in a car accident in 2001. His death aroused suspicions of a politically
motivated murder among his admirers, who promptly proclaimed him a martyr of the national
cause. Cf. Jerej Velibor Džomić,  U večni spomen: Nebojša M. Krstić;  Nenad M. Jovanović,  Novi
srpski mučenik; Bojan Mitić, Neustrašivi vitez krsta, all on http://www.srb-orbraz.org/, accessed
29/01/2008.
44.  Cf. Nikolić 2001, AI 2001. Recently, Obraz again threatened to use violence in order to prevent
public  manifestations  of  gay  and lesbian  pride  in  Serbia.  Cf.  Homo  frka,  http://www.srb-
obraz.org/, accessed 26/04/2008.
45.  This, again, is possibly due to the alleged sympathies of high-ranking individuals in Serbia’s
political establishmentfor Obraz and its aims.
46.   Cf.  http://www.obraz.org.yu/,  Why  Obraz?,  accessed  14/11/2007.  This  website  is  now
defunct. The new website can be found under http://www.srb-obraz.org/.
47.  “Mi smo za Srbstvo sa Obrazom i zato smo (…) za krst časni umesto demonske petokrake, za
slobodu  zlatu  umesto  novog  svetskog  poretka  (…).”  http://www.srb-obraz.org/,  Osnovne
smernice, accessed 01/03/2008.
48.  “Obraz je jedini pokret za školu sa verom, politiku sa poštenjem, vojsku sa rodoljubljem i
državu sa Božijim blagoslovom.” http://www.srb-obraz.org/, O nama, accessed 01/03/2008. This
phrase  refers  to  a  statement  by  Nikolaj  Velimirović  quoted  ibid.  See  also  http://
www.obraz.org.yu/, Why Obraz?, accessed 14/11/2007.
49.  Cf.  http://www.obraz.org.yu/,  The Basic Guidelines,  accessed 14/11/2007, cf.  also Mladen
Obradović: Srbska mladost za srbsku Srbiju, http://www.srb-obraz.net/, accessed 29/01/2008. 
50.  Cf. http://www.obraz.org.yu/, The Basic Guidelines, accessed 14/11/2007.
51.  Cf. http://www.srb-obraz.org/, Srbskim neprijateljima, accessed 01/03/2008.
52.  Croats are referred to as “Ustaše”, Muslims as “extremists”, and Albanians as “terrorists”.
The term “Cionist” is defined as “anti-Christian Jewish racist”. Cf. http://www.srb-obraz.org/,
Srbskim  neprijateljima,  accessed  01/03/2008.  Other  “enemies”  of  the  Serbian  nation  include
“communists”, “fascists” (sic), “satanists”, “mondialists” etc. Cf. http://www.obraz.org.yu/, The
Basic Principles, accessed 14/11/2007.
53.  “In our glorious Serbian history we have never and nowhere subjugated nor persecuted
anyone.” http://www.obraz.org.yu/, The Basic Principles, accessed 14/11/2007.
54.  Cf.  “God is  with  us!”  Interview  with  Nenad  M.  Jovanović,  Pravda,  01/03/2002,  http://
www.newsfromrussia.com/politics/2002/03/01/26725.html, accessed 14/11/2007.
55.  Cf.  “Nije  svaki  Srbin  ratni  zločinac“,  http://www.pcnen.com/,  17/04/2002,  accessed
01/02/2008;  “Možda  je  poneki  Srbin  i  Radovan  ali  nije  svaki  zločinac”,  http://
www.dnevnik.co.yu/, 18/04/2002, accessed 01/02/2008.
56.  Cf. http://www.srb-obraz.org/., Srbskim neprijateljima, accessed 01/03/2008. 
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57.  The Serbian Ministry of Interior Affairs and the Security Council of the Vojvodina Assembly
classified  Obraz as  a  clerical-fascist  ( klerofašistički)  organization.  Cf.  Prvi  zvaničan  spisak
neonacista, 10/12/2005, http://www.b92.net/ , accessed 14/11/2007. 
58.  Cf. http://www.obraz.org.yu/, The Basic Principles, accessed 14/11/2007.
59.  Cf. http://www.bloodandhonour.com/, World Wide Chapters, accessed 02/02/2008.
60.  Cf. http://www.bhserbia.org/, O nama,  accessed 14/11/2007.
61.  In neo-Nazi circles, “18” stands for the initials of Adolf Hitler.
62.  Cf. http://www.bhserbia.org/, Osnivanje Combat 18, accessed 14/11/2007.
63.  Cf. http://www.bhserbia.org/, Izdanja and Koncerti, accessed 14/11/2007.
64.  Cf. http://www.bhserbia.org/, O nama, Intervju, accessed 14/11/2007. On the same website,
the cowardly assault of four activists on a gay man in Belgrade in July 2004 is celebrated as a good
example of  “leaderless resistance”. Cf. http://www.bhserbia.org/, Vesti, accessed 14/11/2007.
65.  Cf. http://www.bhserbia.org/, O nama, accessed 14/11/2007. Only recently, Nacionalni stroj
established its own website, cf. http://www.nacionalnistroj.org/, accessed 28/04/2008.
66.  Cf. http://www.bhserbia.org/, Vesti, accessed 14/11/2007. On Goran Davidović see also his
website http://www.gorandavidovic.com/. Over the past few years, Goran Davidović repeatedly
came into conflict with the law. In 2006, he received a one-year prison sentence for inciting
hatred  after  he  and  other  members  of  Nacionalni  stroj had  attacked  participants  in  a  public
discussion at  the University  of  Novi  Sad in November 2005 (cf.  Osuđeni  članovi  Nacionalnog
stroja, 10/11/2006, http://www.b92.net/, accessed 28/04/2008). The sentence will be reviewed by
Serbia’s  High  Court  in  June  2008  following  an  appeal  by  Davidović  (cf.  U  junu  o  žalbama
Nacionalnog stroja, 21/04/2008, http://www.b92.net/, accessed 28/04/2008). In connection with
the  Novi  Sad  incident,  Davidović  already  served  a  seven  day  prison  sentence  for  physically
assaulting  one  of  the  participants  (cf.  Saslušanja  i  zatvor za  neonaciste,  09/10/2007,  http://
www.b92.net/, accessed 28/04/2008). In 2007, Davidović was detained and later released by the
police in relation with death threats against journalist Dinko Gruhonjić published on Nacionalni
stroj’s pages on http://www.stormfront.org/ (cf. Goran D. pušten iz zatvora, 08/04/2007, http://
www.b92.net/, accessed 28/04/2008). In June 2007, Davidović was found guilty of libel in a law
suit brought against him by Gruhonjić (cf. Odšteta za povredu časti novinara, 25/07/2007, http://
www.b92.net/, accessed 28/04/2008). In autumn 2008, Goran Davidović was interrogated by the
police under suspicion of  breaching public  order in connection with the “March for  Serbian
Unity”  (cf.  Saslušanja  i  zatvor  za  neonaciste,  09/10/2007,  http://www.b92.net/,  accessed
28/04/2008).
67.  Cf. http://www.b92.net/specijal/kosovo2004, accessed 04/02/2008.
68.  Cf. http://www.bhserbia.org/, Vesti, accessed 02/02/2008.
69.  Cf.  Ipak  zabranjen  skup  neonacista,  26/09/2007  and  Incident  na  antifašističkom  skupu,
07/10/2008, both on http://www.b92.net/, accessed 27/04/2008. For Krv i čast’s version of the
event, cf. http://www.bhserbia.org/, Vesti, accessed 02/02/2008. For Nacionalni Stroj’s version, cf.
Goran  Davidović:  O  događajima  7.  oktobra  u  Novom  Sadu,  http://www.gorandavidovic.com/,
Tekstovi, accessed 02/02/2008. 
70.  Cf. http://www.stormfront.org/, Stormfront Srbija, Aktivizam, accessed 02/02/2008.
71.  Examples can be viewed on http://www.stormfront.org/, Aktivizam, accessed 28/04/2008. 
72.  Cf.  http://www.bhserbia.org/,  Deset  Principa  Nacional  Socijalizma  and  Lična  Revolucija,
accessed 14/11/2007.
73.  Cf. http://www.bhserbia.org/, Biblioteka, Članci, Abortus, sredstvo planskog uništenja and
Muškarci i žene, accessed 14/11/2007.
74.  Cf.  http://www.bhserbia.org/,  Osnivanje  Combat  18  u  Srbiji,  accessed  14/11/2007.  The
website  hosts  the notorious  antisemitic  pamphlet   “Protocols  of  the Elders  of  Zion”  (http://
www.bhserbia.org/, Biblioteka, Knjige, accessed 02/02/2008). Copies of anti-Semitic publications
such as Milorad Mojić’ “Srpski narod u kandžama Jevreja” (The Serbian people in the claws of the
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Jews”, ca. 1941) and Vasa Pelagić’ “Vjerozakonsko učenje Talmuda” (The Talmudic Teachings of
Religious  Law,  1877)  can  be  bought  from  Krv  i  čast,  cf.  http://www.bhserbia.org/,  Izdanja,
Brošure, accessed 02/02/2008.
75.  “Samo su ljudi snažne ličnosti i volje spremni da žrtvuju sve i krenu u borbu za spasenje i
preporod  naše  nacije  i  rase  i  rušenje  cionističko-kapitalističkog  sistema  koji  uništava  našu
voljenu majku Srbiju.” http://www.bhserbia.org/, Biblioteka, Članci, Lična revolucija, accessed
14/11/2007.
76.  http://www.bhserbia.org/,  Glavna,  accessed 02/02/2008:  “24.  mart  1999 -  24.  mart  2007:
Osam  godina  od  cionističke  NATO  agresije  na  Srbiju.”  On  March  24,  2007,  Nacionalni  stroj
organized a public meeting in Belgrade to mark the eighth anniversary of the beginning of the
NATO  bombardement.  Among  the  speakers  was  Goran  Davidović.  Cf.  http://
www.stormfront.org/, Aktivizam, Memorialni skup, accessed 13/11/2007. A similar meeting this
year  was  banned  by  the  authorities,  but  took  place  nevertheless.  Cf.  http://
www.nacionalnistroj.org/, accessed 30/04/2008.
77.  Obraz refers to NATO as “Judeo-masonic murderers”, http://www.obraz.org.yu/, The Basic
Principles, accessed 14/11/2007.
78.  Cf.  http://www.bhserbia.org/,  O  nama,  Intervju,  accessed  14/11/2007.  This  is  another
parallel between Krv i čast and Obraz.
79.  Cf. http://www.stormfront.org/, Nacionalni Stroj, Aktivizam, Program i statut Nacionalnog
Stroja, accessed 13/11/2007: “Cilj Nacionalnog stroja je očuvanje i preporod zdravih vrednosti
srpske nacije, kao sastavnog dela bele rase (…).”
80.  Cf. http://www.stormfront.org/, Nacionalni Stroj, Aktivizam, Program i statut Nacionalnog
Stroja, accessed 13/11/2007. Quotations: “Zalagaćemo se za unitarnu srpsku nacionalnu državu u
kojoj će osnovna načela biti nacionalna sloboda, socijalna pravda i rasno biološka zaštita naroda.“
(pt. 5); “U korist jedinstvene funkcije srpskog nacionalnog tela, rasna i nacionalna svest mora
ugasiti borbu među klasama i strukama u jedinstvu, od radnika i seljaka do intelektualaca, da
svako vrši svoju funkciju u organskoj narodnoj zajednici.“ (pt. 26) Again, the similarity to Obraz’s
programme is striking, the one main difference being Nacionalni stroj’s emphasis on racism.
ABSTRACTS
This paper surveyed the extreme right scene in contemporary Serbia and discussed four groups –
Srpski Sabor Dveri, Otačastveni Pokret Obraz, Krv i čast and Nacionalni stroj – in more detail. It
showed that the programmes of these organizations are strikingly similar in that they focus on
an exaggerated nationalism centred on the idea of national rebirth and a populist suspicion of
democratic values, institutions and processes. The main difference seems to be that the Christian
right groups yearn for a renewal of the nation through a return to “traditional values”, among
which  Orthodox  piety,  hierarchical  social  relations  and  a  rural  way  of  life  feature  most
prominently, while the racist right associations strive for a national renaissance based on the
alleged supremacy of the white “race”.
Cet article étudie l'extrême droite dans la Serbie d’aujourd’hui et aborde quatre groupes - Srpski
Sabor Dveri, Otačastveni Pokret Obraz, Krv i čast et Nacionalni stroj –plus en détails. Il montre
que les programmes de ces organisations sont très semblables en ce qu'ils se concentrent sur un
nationalisme  exacerbé  basé  sur  l'idée  de  la  renaissance  nationale  et  une  remise  en  cause
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populiste des valeurs, des institutions et des processus démocratiques. La principale différence
semble être que les groupes de la droite chrétienne aspirent à un renouveau de la nation par un
retour aux "valeurs traditionnelles", dont la piété orthodoxe, les relations sociales hiérarchiques
et un mode de vie rurale prédominant, tandis que les associations de la droite raciste œuvrent en
faveur d'une renaissance nationale fondée sur la prétendue suprématie de la "race" blanche.
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